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Abstract
Assuming that private agents need to learn inflation dynamics to form their inflation
expectations and that they believe a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
is the true data generating process of inflation, we aim at establishing the role of
forward-looking information in inflation expectation dynamics. We find that longer-
term expectations are crucial in shaping shorter-horizon expectations. Professional
forecasters put a greater weight on forward-looking information – presumably captur-
ing beliefs about the central bank inflation target or trend inflation –, while lagged
inflation remains significant. Finally, the NKPC-based inflation expectations model
fits well for professional forecasts in contrast to consumers’.
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1 Introduction
Private expectations regarding future economic developments influence current decisions
about wages, savings and investments, and concurrently, policy decisions. In recent years
there has been an increasing interest in explaining the private inflation expectations for-
mation process by departing from the full information rational expectations hypothesis.1
Another strand of literature has focused on inflation dynamics and the role of private
expectations estimating New Keynesian Phillips Curves (NKPC).2
By bridging these two strands of literature, this paper investigates whether longer-term
private inflation expectations play a role in determining shorter-term inflation expecta-
tions, and aims at establishing the role of past, present and forward-looking information
in inflation expectation dynamics. In a setting with homogeneous agents, assuming that
private agents need to learn the dynamics of inflation to form their inflation expectations
and that they believe the reduced-form hybrid NKPC is the true data generating process
of inflation dynamics –so the agents’ estimated perceived law of motion–, our contribution
to the literature is to propose an NKPC-based inflation expectations formation equation.
We thus assess whether and by how much private inflation expectations are driven by
forward-looking information (i.e. further-ahead expectations), current information (e.g.
the current output gap), or backward-looking information (i.e. past realised inflation).
Three papers have opened this line of research. Lanne, Luoma, and Luoto (2009) find
that inflation expectations are consistent with a sticky-information model where a pro-
portion of households base their expectations on past inflation, while Pfajfar and Santoro
(2010) show that the distribution of private forecasts might be explained by three different
1Within this literature, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose a sticky-information model where private
agents may form rational expectations, but only update their information set each period with a certain
probability as they face costs of absorbing and processing information. Sims (2003) as well as Mackowiak
and Wiederholt (2009) focus on partial and noisy information models. Albeit updating continuously in this
framework, it is an optimal choice for private agents - internalising their information processing capacity
constraints - to remain inattentive to some part of the available information because incorporating all
signals is impossible (see also Moscarini, 2004, for a similar idea). In both types of models, a fraction of the
information set used by private agents is backward-looking, i.e. based on past information. Carroll (2003),
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), Pesaran and Weale (2006), Branch (2007), Nunes (2009), Andrade and
Le Bihan (2010), Coibion (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) provide empirical evidence
based on survey data to characterise and distinguish these types of models.
2Roberts (1995, 1997), Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Rudd and Whelan (2005), Nunes (2010) and Adam and
Padula (2011), among others, assess the relative weights of forward- and backward-looking components of
inflation. The latter may play a role due to a share of ”backward-looking“ firms that do not re-optimise
their prices but set them according to a rule of thumb (see e.g. Steinsson, 2003) or index their prices
completely to lagged inflation as in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
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expectation formation processes: a static or highly auto-regressive process, a nearly ratio-
nal approach, and adaptive learning and sticky information models. Cornea, Hommes, and
Massaro (2012) find time-variation and heterogeneity in the type of expectations formation
with evolutionary switching between backward- and forward-looking behaviour.
Estimating the parameters of our proposed model matters for understanding how pri-
vate expectations are formed and how policymakers can anchor them. Optimal monetary
policy is determined by the degree of price stickiness (see e.g. Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin, 2000; Steinsson, 2003) and by the expectations formation process, i.e. whether pri-
vate agents use up-to-date information about the state of the economy or continue using
their previous plans and set prices based on outdated information (see e.g. Ball, Mankiw,
and Reis, 2005; Reis, 2009). Therefore, the real effects of monetary policy and policy
recommendations depend on the speed of price adjustments which in turn depend on the
(in)completeness of information and/or the degree of backward- and forward-lookingness
of price setters and inflation forecasts.
We estimate our NKPC-based inflation expectations formation equation on US data,
for which survey expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are fixed-horizon
forecasts and available on a long time span: 1981Q3-2012Q3. We use both GDP deflator
and CPI to measure inflation as well as various variables for marginal costs including
a constructed measure of the output gap. In addition, we also assess whether relative
weights vary for different forecasting horizons and if expectations of consumers differ from
those of professional forecasters.
We provide original evidence that longer-term inflation expectations are crucial in de-
termining shorter-horizon inflation expectations. More precisely, our results are threefold.
First, professional forecasters put relatively more weight on forward-looking information,
while past information is significant and the contribution of the marginal cost measure
is small and often insignificantly different from zero.3 Second, the coefficients are similar
to those found in the literature estimating the actual NKPC which suggests that profes-
sional forecasters may indeed use this approach to form their own inflation expectations.4
3This result is found to be robust to specification tests, to the exclusion of the financial crisis and post-
2007 data, to the use of real-time data, to GMM estimation, to various measures of marginal costs, to the
use of the mean of individual responses, and to the inclusion of potentially relevant additional variables.
4Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Moller, and Stock (2014) survey empirical evidence on the actual NKPC and
find a vast set of results. Our estimated coefficients for the NKPC-based equation are in the mode region
of the distribution of all point estimates they report.
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Consumers seem to differ from professionals in that their inflation forecasts do not follow
the NKPC-based formation process. Third, we also find that the estimated parameters of
this NKPC-based expectations formation model are relatively stable when the forecasting
horizon varies or when we consider further-ahead horizons for forward-looking information.
While it might appear circular to explain expectations formation by further-ahead sur-
vey expectations, Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) and Cecchetti, Hooper, Kasman, Schoen-
holtz, and Watson (2007) provide evidence that survey inflation expectations have a good
forecasting performance which stems from survey respondents’ ability to anticipate struc-
tural change. One reason why private agents use further-ahead expectations - information
at horizons further ahead than the forecasting horizon - to form their expectations could
thus be that further-ahead expectations might be seen as a representation of the long-
run equilibrium value of inflation, and are therefore driven by beliefs about the central
bank inflation target or are projections of the trend inflation rate, which would in turn
depend, on the central bank credibility to achieve inflation stabilisation. This is in line
with the argument by Faust and Wright (2012) that inflation expectations represent the
way forecasters believe inflation takes from its current expected value (nowcast) towards
the perceived trend inflation rate.
The two main implications of these results for policymakers are first that anchoring
medium- or long-term expectations enables anchoring shorter-term expectations, and sec-
ond that private expectations still depend (in part) on past information. Besides, the
estimated parameters may serve for calibrating macroeconomic models in which private
expectations are not solely forward-looking. Finally, another implication for future re-
search is that professional forecasters appear to form their inflation expectations on the
grounds of the hybrid NKPC.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology.
Section 3 reports the empirical analysis, while sections 4 and 5 focus on the effect of
forecasting horizons and on a comparison with consumers’ forecasts respectively. Section
6 concludes.
4
2 Methodology
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) propose a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve of the following
form, where pit is the inflation rate, Etpit+1 expected future inflation, and mct a measure
of marginal costs:
pit = λmct + γfEtpit+1 + γbpit−1. (1)
The equation derives from a New Keynesian model with staggered price setting a la Calvo,
where a fraction of firms set their prices using the lagged aggregate inflation rate, γf and γb
being the weights on the forward-looking and the backward-looking variable respectively.
Under the assumption of unbiased expectations and in the case of current-quarter
expectations, it holds that pit = Etpit + t, where the error term t has zero mean.5 It is
worth mentioning that this specification is different from rational expectations, for which
three additional assumptions would be required: t is normally distributed, not serially
correlated, and uncorrelated with all past information (any variable dated t or earlier).
Combining these two equations yields the following NKPC-based inflation expectations
formation equation:
Etpit = λmct + γfEtpit+1 + γbpit−1 − t (2)
We use the output gap xt as a proxy for marginal costs (as is common in the literature;
see e.g. Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Woodford, 2003) and we measure expected inflation by
survey expectations as is recently done in the literature on Phillips curve estimations (see
Nunes, 2009; Adam and Padula, 2011) or on monetary policy rules (see e.g. Orphanides,
2001). We thus estimate the following equation, where St represents inflation expectations
collected from a survey of forecasters:
Stpit = δxt + βfStpit+1 + βbpit−1 + νt, (3)
and where the error term νt = ut − t has zero mean, and it is not restricted otherwise
such as the estimated measurement error ut.
6
This approach is different but related to the study by Smith (2009) that proposes a
forecast pooling method which improves statistical fit compared to GMM estimation of the
5We precede our empirical analysis with tests of the assumption that the survey value is an unbiased
predictor in section 2.2 and explain what a departure from it would imply for our estimations.
6We also precede our empirical analysis with tests (in section 2.2) that the error term νt is uncorrelated
with the expectation term. We thus analyse whether endogeneity may be an issue in this specification, so
that ordinary least squares would be inconsistent.
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NKPC but not dramatically compared to the use of surveys, while Nunes (2010)’ different
pooling approach gives less weight to surveys, while they still appear as a key ingredient
of the information set of price-setters. It is worth adding that Kozicki and Tinsley (2012)
develop a model of expected inflation linking realised inflation rates to SPF forecasts,
while Brissimis and Magginas (2008) provide a similar method using the hybrid NKPC.7
Our empirical model is derived from a monopolistic price setting environment with ho-
mogeneous agents as in Adam and Padula (2011) where rational expectations are substi-
tuted by the median of forecasters’ subjective expectations. We then obtain the dynamics
of inflation expectations by combining the process explaining inflation dynamics and the
property that the median of forecasters’ subjective expectations is unbiased as shown e.g.
by Thomas (1999), Croushore (2010) or Smith (2009). One can therefore view this NKPC-
based inflation expectation formation equation as the forecasting function of an adaptive
learning model in which private agents learn about inflation dynamics by estimating the
hybrid NKPC in its reduced form as their perceived law of motion of inflation.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We focus on quarterly US data for which survey forecasts from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters (SPF) are available on a fixed-horizon scheme8 and for a long time
span: 1981Q3-2012Q3. SPF expectations for the GDP deflator are actually available as
of 1968Q4, however, we present our main results for the above-mentioned period in order
to fulfil stationarity requirements and to be consistent with respect to CPI inflation for
which survey data does not exist before 1981.9 We use the median of individual responses
as our baseline, and propose robustness tests with the mean. SPF inflation forecasts for
7The objective of our study is not directly related to the ones of the just mentioned papers, its focus
being on inflation expectation dynamics – crucial for understanding how inflation expectations evolve –
rather than on inflation dynamics per se. We build on this abundant literature and borrow the result that
the NKPC is a robust representation of how inflation evolves.
8An advantage of fixed-horizon forecasts compared to fixed-event forecasts is that the latter have a
decreasing forecasting horizon in each calendar year. One might thus consider this variable as not being
drawn from the same stochastic process which introduces heteroscedasticity in the estimation process.
9For a discussion on stationarity in the context of survey expectations see Adam and Padula (2011).
We verify the consistency of our main results with the alternative longer sample for the GDP deflator.
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Figure 1: Survey PGDP Inflation Expectations and Actual PGDP
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Note: This figure shows SPF survey expectations for the GDP deflator (PGDP), as
well as its realised values. The following abbreviations are used: spf pgdp t is the
nowcast of the GDP deflator, spf pgdp t+1 is the one-quarter ahead forecast and
pgdp is the actual GDP deflator measured with final data.
both the GDP deflator and CPI inflation fulfil stationary requirements.10 We also analyse
how consumer expectations differ from those of professionals making use of the University
of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.
Figures 1 and 2 plot SPF inflation expectations at the current horizon (nowcast) and
the one-quarter ahead horizon for the GDP deflator and CPI inflation. Consistent with
US inflation history, inflation expectations followed the disinflation path during the eight-
ies while they have been anchored around 2% ever since. An exception to that is the
considerable volatility in the nowcast of CPI inflation around the financial crisis.
As the output gap we employ the filtered version of real GDP growth. We use the
one-sided Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) Random Walk band-pass filter under the common
assumption of a business cycle duration of 6 up to 32 quarters (see Christiano and Fitzger-
10Stationarity tests are available from the authors upon request. We find that the null hypothesis of a
unit root can be rejected for both the GDP deflator and CPI inflation survey variables at all horizons except
for three-quarter-ahead expectations of the former inflation measure on the sample starting in 1981Q3. On
the sample starting in 1968Q4 a unit root though cannot be rejected for the GDP deflator at all horizons.
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Figure 2: Survey CPI Inflation Expectations and Actual CPI
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Note: This figure shows SPF survey expectations for CPI inflation, as well as its
realised values. The following abbreviations are used: spf cpi t is the nowcast of
CPI inflation, spf cpi t+1 is the one-quarter ahead forecast and cpi is the actual CPI
inflation measured with final data.
ald, 2003).11 To check the robustness of the results we also use the output gap based on
the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
We also employ other marginal cost measures frequently considered in the literature
namely unit labour costs, labour share, unemployment rate, inventories, industrial pro-
duction index and capacity utilisation. Further, we evaluate our models with real-time
data to examine whether results are different with respect to the use of final revised data.
The SPF survey and other real-time data come from the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia,
while final data and the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers (UMSC) are from
the FRED database. See the Data Appendix for more details.
3.2 Pre-Tests
First, we evaluate the assumption of unbiased expectations. To test for unbiasedness, we
estimate a model: pit+h = αu+βuStpit+h+ηt, as is common in the literature (see e.g. Smith,
11Using a one-sided filter means that the estimated output gap does not contain any information about
the future which is not available in real-time. We also use non-filtered measures in the robustness section.
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2009; Adam and Padula, 2011). Unbiasedness requires the constant α to be equal to zero
and βu to equal 1. If this is not the case a constant enters equation 2 and accordingly
equation 3, and/or the coefficients are divided by a coefficient βu which, however, would
not require a different estimation technique.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 10 in the Appendix. As shown by
Smith (2009), SPF forecast unbiasedness cannot be rejected at any horizon for both final
and real-time data for the GDP deflator over the extended sample starting in 1968Q4;
however, it can be easily rejected in sub-samples. On the sample starting in 1981Q3,
unbiasedness cannot be rejected for GDP deflator current-quarter forecast using real-time
data, whereas it can be for final data. CPI inflation current quarter forecasts are unbiased
for both real-time and final data. To account for potential bias in expectations, we estimate
all models with a constant α verifying that it is insignificant.
Second, we precede our empirical analysis with tests for endogeneity of the explanatory
variables, so that ordinary least squares would be inconsistent. We compute a test based on
the difference between two Hansen-Sargan statistics (one for the GMM approach and one
for the OLS approach).12 The null hypothesis is that the tested variables are exogenous.
For the GDP deflator variable the test yields p-values of 0.24, 0.39 and 0.14 for the
three GMM approaches considered, respectively: i.e. we test whether the error term νt
is uncorrelated with only the expectation term, with the latter and the output gap, and
with all three explanatory variables. For the CPI inflation variable, the test gives p-values
of 0.72, 0.93 and 0.88 for the three cases, respectively. This provides evidence in favour of
OLS consistent estimates. In order to further assess this issue, we estimate our empirical
model using GMM as a robustness check and show that any potential endogeneity does
not affect the main results of this paper.
3.3 Baseline Results
We present OLS estimates of equation 3 for both inflation measures in Table 1. We com-
pute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors assuming
that the autocorrelation dies out after four quarters.13
12These tests are based on the GMM specifications and instrument set detailed in the Appendix and in
the robustness subsection 3.8.
13This choice corresponds to the Stock and Watson (2007) rule of thumb where the Newey-West lag
length is set equal to 0.75× T 13 (rounded), T being the number of observations used in the regression.
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Table 1: NKPC-Based Inflation Expectations Formation Model
Baseline Constrained Extended Sample
GDP deflator CPI inflation GDP deflator CPI inflation Baseline Constrained
δ −0.04∗ 0.08 −0.03 0.07 −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
βf 0.82
∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
βb 0.14
∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
const 0.10 −0.28 −0.03 −0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.12) (0.29) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
R2 0.92 0.73 - - 0.94 -
βf + βb = 1 0.31 0.41 - - 0.97 -
Obs 124 124 124 124 175 175
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of equation 3
(including a constant), is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are in
parentheses in the ’Baseline’ models. The ’Constrained’ approach enforces the following condition: βf +
βb = 1. In this case the variance estimates of the standard errors are the Huber/White/sandwich robust
variance estimates. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3 for the first four columns; the last two
columns present the ’Baseline’ and ’Constrained’ results for the GDP deflator for the sample starting
in 1968Q4. In the last two rows the R2 of the regression, as well as the p-value of an F test for the
hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 are presented for the ’Baseline’ estimations. The final row reports the
number of observations. The output gap is derived by means of the CF filter.
The coefficients on the forward- and backward-looking element of the inflation expec-
tations formation process are estimated to be (0.82, 0.14) and (0.88, 0.19) for the GDP
deflator and CPI inflation, respectively. This is, forward-looking dynamics dominate the
formation process for both inflation expectation measures, while the backward-looking
part is still significant in either case. This outcome is consistent with the literature fo-
cusing on the expectations formation process which finds a role, small but significant, for
backward-looking behaviour as in Lanne, Luoma, and Luoto (2009) or Pfajfar and San-
toro (2010). The resulting coefficients are also similar to those found in the literature on
estimations of the actual New Keynesian Phillips Curve (see e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999;
Woodford, 2003; Nunes, 2010; Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Moller, and Stock, 2014). It suggests
that forecasters may form their predictions on the grounds of the NKPC assuming that it
properly captures inflation dynamics.14
In line with the NKPC literature we evaluate the hypothesis that the weights on the
backward- and the forward-looking element add up to one by means of a partial F test.
14Estimating equation 3 on a sample ending in 2007Q3, so excluding the global financial crisis, yields
extremely similar results and excludes that these outcomes are driven by recent data only.
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For both inflation measures the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This is what other
studies find in evaluations of the actual NKPC (Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003).
As far as the marginal cost measure is concerned the results for the two inflation
variables differ. Whereas the coefficient on the output gap is negative and marginally
significant, i.e. at the 10% level, for the GDP deflator, it is positive and insignificant for
CPI inflation. The negative sign on the output gap coefficient for the GDP deflator model
might be a surprise on theoretical grounds, while it is well documented empirically in the
NKPC literature (see Woodford, 2003; Nunes, 2010).
The high R2 of 0.92 for the GDP deflator model, among other things, derives from
the fact that survey expectations of the GDP deflator at different horizons are highly
correlated. Given the high correlation among inflation variables and the survey measure
we test for multicollinearity evaluating the uncentered variance inflation factors, and we
reject it for the models we analyse in this paper and thus do not discuss this issue further.
We also verify that including a constant does not improve the fit of the model, as the
constant is statistically insignificant in both models.
As is common in the NKPC literature, we further evaluate a model where we constrain
the sum of the coefficients βf and βb to one (see e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999). In this
case the variance estimates of the standard errors are the Huber-White/sandwich robust
variance estimates. The results based on this approach are also presented in Table 1. For
the GDP deflator the estimates are very similar, while the ouput gap is now completely
insignificant. For CPI inflation the constrained approach yields similar coefficients. Given
that the estimation of the constrained model involves a change in the dependent variable,
no goodness-of-fit measure is provided as it would have a different interpretation.
We implement a model specification test to assess whether our NKPC-based equation
is properly specified. If this is the case, one should not be able to find any additional inde-
pendent variables that are significant except by chance. More specifically, we test whether
the squared fitted values of our baseline regression are a significant determinant of the
dependent variable. The intuition behind the link test is that if the model is correctly
specified, the squared fitted values should have no explanatory power. For the GDP defla-
tor and CPI inflation, the p-values associated with the squared fitted values are 0.50 and
0.88, respectively, suggesting that the present results are not driven by misspecification.
These findings square well with the evidence by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010).
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They argue that deviations from the full-information rational expectations hypothesis are
unlikely to be driven by departures from rationality and instead are driven by deviations
from the assumption of full information. This is consistent with our finding of a significant
lagged inflation rate in the forecasters’ expectations formation equation suggesting the
presence of informational rigidities in the economy which does not preclude rationality of
the forecasters.
In the last two columns of Table 1, we present results for the extended sample for the
GDP deflator.15 They are similar to those found for the shorter sample. A few notable
exceptions are a relatively higher weight on backward-looking expectations (now at 0.24)
and a significant output gap. The first finding could be related to a larger emphasis on
backward-looking information when forecasting in the early part of the sample. Studies
on the actual NKPC similarly find a larger weight on backward-looking elements in the
1960s and 1970s (see e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999)). The second finding can be explained
by a steeper Phillips Curve consistently with the literature on the actual NKPC.16
3.4 Model Comparisons
The previous results provide support for our NKPC-based expectations formation model,
i.e. the fact that the coefficients on the forward- and backward-looking variables are
significantly different from zero and in line with NKPC estimates may be interpreted as
evidence in favour of this baseline model. As a next step, we compare our baseline model to
two major alternative inflation expectations formation processes, namely a purely forward-
looking (γb = 0 in equation 3) and a purely backward-looking model (γf = 0). We present
parameter estimates for the alternative models and LR test results to provide evidence in
favour or against the alternative models relative to our baseline.
The LR test clearly rejects the reduced models in favour of our baseline NKPC-based
inflation expectations formation model for both the GDP deflator and CPI inflation.
15SPF inflation expectations are found to be not stationary over this sample in the US which potentially
affects the reliability of the respective results. Inflation itself is also found to be non-stationary in the US
and accordingly many forecasting studies make use of models with inflation in first differences, see e.g.
Stock and Watson (1999). For a discussion of stationarity of SPF inflation expectations see Adam and
Padula (2011).
16Given the non-stationarity issue and the similarity of estimates found, we focus from here onwards on
the shorter sample. An exception is the section on subsamples, where we consider it relevant to analyse
how inflation expectations where formed in the early part of the long sample. We verified that the results
do not differ between the longer and the shorter sample for the other specifications discussed in this paper.
Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Model Comparisons
Forward-looking model Backward-looking model
GDP deflator CPI inflation GDP deflator CPI inflation
δ(a) -0.05* 0.08 -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10)
βf 0.92*** 1.08***
(0.05) (0.11)
βb 0.78*** 0.46***
(0.08) (0.07)
const 0.16 -0.29 0.69*** 1.62***
(0.12) (0.36 (0.19)) (0.16)
R2 0.91 0.67 0.65 0.41
βf = 1 0.11 0.48 - -
βb = 1 - - 0.01*** 0.00***
LR test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Obs 124 124 124 124
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Esti-
mation of the forward-looking and the backward-looking model is conducted
by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are in parentheses.
The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3. In the rows below the parameter
estimates the R2 of the regression and the p-value of an F test for the hy-
pothesis that the given parameter equals one are presented. Further, the
p-value corresponding to an LR test of the alternative model relative to the
baseline model and the number of observations are given.
Note, however, that the LR test is based on the assumption of homoskedastic and non-
autocorrelated errors. We thus ask the reader to interpret these results with caution. It
stands out though that both LR test results and the t-statistics in Table 1 point in the
same direction, i.e. our baseline model performs better than the alternatives.
Turning to the parameter estimates, the purely backward- and the purely forward-
looking model perform very differently. The latter has an R2 similar to the baseline
case and the coefficient βf is insignificantly different from one. The former model on the
other hand has a significantly lower R2 with the coefficient βf being significantly smaller
than one, while the constant is large and significant. We interpret these results as the
purely forward-looking model approximating our baseline model reasonably well, while
the backward-looking model is clearly inferior. In either case though it seems that our
baseline model performs better.17
17We also compare our model to an autoregressive model. Performing two non-nested model tests
suggested by Coibion (2010), we find that both our baseline model and the AR model cannot be rejected
statistically, while the former is preferred over the alternative. The same conclusion can be drawn from
comparing our baseline model to an alternative in which inflation expectations are explained by shorter-
horizon inflation expectations. Results are available upon request.
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3.5 Final versus Real-Time Data
We also present estimates based on real-time data since in our context the timing of
information is paramount and calls for carefulness. Orphanides (2001) stresses that the
use of final revised data in Taylor rule estimations may cause misleading results given that
agents can only know the most recent publication of data rather than revisions that would
be published in the future. Accordingly the determinants of inflation and hence inflation
expectations should then depend on the information available to agents at that time. We
thus also evaluate our models with real-time data stemming from the Real-Time Database
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
We replace both the inflation measure as well as the real GDP growth variable used
to construct the output gap by their first vintage published. The results for both the
GDP deflator and CPI inflation are presented in Table 3. The parameter estimates are
qualitatively unchanged. While the forward-looking coefficient is somewhat lower and the
backward-looking coefficient is somewhat higher than before in the GDP deflator model,
both are higher in the CPI model. Note, however, that in the latter model the standard
errors are larger which is related to the fact that real-time data for CPI inflation is not
available before 1994Q1 and thus 52 observations less are used. Based on real-time data,
the coefficient on the output gap becomes insignificant in the GDP deflator model, in the
CPI model it is marginally significant.
One can also argue that even the first release of real GDP growth is not yet known at
time t, as survey respondents have to provide their answers during a given quarter, while
the first vintage of this given quarter will typically not be released before the following
quarter. Therefore we replace the output gap measure based on this first release by the
output gap measure based on the nowcast for real GDP growth from the SPF. The results
are very similar to our baseline estimates as can be seen in Table 3.
3.6 Subsamples
One might ask whether the apparent fit of the NKPC model in explaining inflation ex-
pectation dynamics stems from the stability of inflation during the Great Moderation. In
other words, for a very high degree of autocorrelation in inflation and accordingly in infla-
tion expectations, a hybrid model, a forward-looking and a backward-looking model would
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Table 3: Real-Time Data Estimation
First vintage Nowcast
GDP deflator CPI inflation GDP deflator CPI inflation
δ −0.04 0.13∗ −0.04 0.16∗
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)
βf 0.77
∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.29) (0.05) (0.28)
βb 0.17
∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
const 0.14 −0.52 0.15 −0.46
(0.10) (0.63) (0.10) (0.61)
R2 0.93 0.70 0.93 0.70
βf + βb = 1 0.15 0.39 0.16 0.43
Obs 124 72 124 72
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of
equation 3 (including a constant), is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags
standard errors are in parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3 for the GDP
deflator and 1994Q3-2012Q3 for the CPI model. In the last two rows the R2 of the regression,
as well as the p-value of an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 are presented. The
final row reports the number of observations. The results for ’First vintage’ are based on the
first release of both the inflation and the real GDP growth variable. The results for ’Nowcast’
rely on the first release of the inflation variable and the nowcast of real GDP growth from the
SPF. The output gap is derived by means of the CF filter.
all fit the data well. We have shown earlier that our NKPC-based model fits the data bet-
ter than some alternatives over the whole sample and we now want to examine whether
our results are robust to the choice of the (sub)sample. Similar estimates would support
the idea that the relative weights on past inflation and inflation expectations are not due
to particular inflation dynamics such as e.g. in the Great Moderation, but capture well a
stable inflation expectation formation process independently of whether inflation itself is
stable or decelerating. Subsample discrepancies in parameter estimates would indicate a
shift across time in the weight professional forecasters put on different information.
Table 4 provides estimates of our NKPC-based model before and after 1992Q3 when
inflation came back to the target range of typically around 2%. Although the starting
date of the Great Moderation is normally set earlier, as of 1992 inflation followed an even
more stable path (estimates are immune to the choice of this specific break date and are
similar for all break dates tested between 1987 and 1995). Finally, setting the break date
that late allows us to have a reasonably large first subsample (43 observations). We also
present results for dividing the longer sample before and after the Great Disinflation; here
we set the break date at 1984Q1. This is the latest candidate break date found in the
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Table 4: Subsample Estimates
GDP deflator CPI inflation Extended sample
Pre 1992Q3 Post 1992Q3 Pre 1992Q3 Post 1992Q3 Pre 1984Q1 Post 1984Q1
δ -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.15* -0.10** -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
βf 0.79*** 0.83*** 1.15*** 1.07*** 0.71*** 0.83***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.19) (0.29) (0.11) (0.04)
βb 0.12 0.14*** 0.18* 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.13***
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03)
const 0.31 0.06 -1.58*** -0.57 0.47 0.10
(0.39) (0.13) (0.53) (0.66) (0.45) (0.10)
R2 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.56 0.85 0.89
βf + βb = 1 0.37 0.57 0.01** 0.39 0.37 0.33
Obs 43 81 43 81 60 115
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of equation 3
(including a constant), is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are in
parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3 for the first four columns; the last two columns
present different subsample results for the GDP deflator with the sample starting in 1968Q4. In the last
two rows the R2 of the regression, as well as the p-value of an F test for the hypothesis that βf +βb = 1
are presented. The final row reports the number of observations. The output gap is derived by means of
the CF filter. The first break date corresponds to the date when inflation came back to the 2% inflation
target; the second break date is the latest candidate break date found in the study by Inoue and Rossi
(2011), who estimate a representative New Keynesian model.
study by Inoue and Rossi (2011). Using this latest break date, once more allows us to
have a reasonably long first subsample, while it does not influence the results significantly
(as compared to setting an earlier break e.g. around 1980).
On the shorter sample, for both the GDP deflator and CPI inflation, the coefficient on
further-ahead expectations is similar before and after the break date and also corresponds
to our estimate for the whole sample. Parameter estimates on past inflation are alike and
significant for CPI inflation before and after 1992Q3, while they are similar for the GDP
deflator but past inflation only becomes significant after the break date. This, however,
could be explained by the relatively small sample size in the first subsample. These results
provide evidence that our model fits the data well along the whole sample and that our
findings are not influenced by the choice of a particular sample. They are not driven by
the relatively stable inflation rates between 1992 and 2007 and are robust to the Great
Disinflation.
On the extended sample, subsample results are somewhat different, consistent with
the literature, showing that the emphasis on backward-looking information was relatively
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higher before the Great Moderation (0.22 versus 0.13). Also, the output gap is significant
(but negative) pre-1984, becoming insignificant thereafter. This squares well with evidence
from the literature of a flattening in the Phillips Curve in the more recent period.
3.7 Does More Information Matter?
We also examine whether the lack of some potentially important but omitted variables –
the federal funds rate and oil prices – may bias the baseline estimates. Survey respondents
might base their expectations on more information than is incorporated in equation 3 and
one way to test whether forecasters form their expectations on the grounds of the NKPC
is to add more variables to the regression to evaluate whether additional information
changes our baseline estimates.18 We include a lag of the federal funds rate - denoted i -
to represent the stance of monetary policy, as well as of the oil price growth rate - denoted
oil - which can be interpreted as an external price shock, and analyse how these affect
the results. Given the high autocorrelation in the interest rate (see e.g. Gal´ı and Gertler,
1999; Mavroeidis, 2010), the previous stance of monetary policy might give an idea about
the present and future stances. Similarly, in light of the fact that an external price shock
takes some time to feed through the economy the shock history tells us something about
future developments. The estimation results for equation 4 below (including a constant)
are given in Table 5:
Stpit = δxt + βfStpit+1 + βbpit−1 + γi it−1 + γo oilt−1 + ηt. (4)
The additional information does not seem to improve the fit of the GDP deflator
model. The R2 is almost the same as in the baseline case and the parameter estimates
are essentially unchanged. The coefficient on the interest rate is insignificant, while the
oil price coefficient is significant but very small. The conclusions from the baseline model
remain unaltered and it seems that omitted variable bias in not an issue for the GDP
deflator model.
The results for the CPI inflation model differ slightly. The coefficient on the oil price is
insignificant, while the one on the interest rate is marginally significant, at the 10% level.
γi is about −0.10, thus a 100 basis points increase in the lagged federal funds rate would
18We also test the effect of including the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) which is a
weighted average of 85 existing indicators of economic activity and related inflationary pressures developed
by Stock and Watson (1999) and supposed to capture the relevant information set of forecasters. Neither
the lagged nor the current value is significant or affects the main parameter estimates.
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Table 5: Omitted Variable Bias
GDP deflator CPI inflation
δ −0.04∗∗ 0.05
(0.02) (0.05)
βf 0.78
∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.23)
βb 0.11
∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
γi 0.03 −0.10∗
(0.02) (0.05)
γo 0.002∗∗ 0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
const 0.11 -0.59
(0.13) (0.40)
R2 0.92 0.75
βf + βb = 1 0.14 0.10*
Obs 124 124
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, re-
spectively. Estimation of equation 4 (including a constant), is
conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard er-
rors are in parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3.
In the last two rows the R2 of the regression, as well as the p-value
of an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 are presented.
The final row reports the number of observations. The output gap
is derived by means of the CF filter.
- as expected - decrease the nowcast of CPI inflation by 0.1% above the indirect effect it
has through expected inflation for the following period. At the same time the R2 increases
slightly from around 0.73 to around 0.75 relative to the baseline case. The output gap still
has an insignificant coefficient. Finally, the coefficient on the forward-looking variable, γf ,
increases to 1.17. Given the relatively high standard error on the forward-looking variable,
the hypothesis that the backward- and forward-looking coefficients add up to one cannot
be rejected. It thus seems that in either case omitted variable bias is not present for our
baseline NKPC-based inflation expectations formation process.19
3.8 Robustness
In the following, we discuss various robustness checks. First, we examine other variables
for marginal cost measures such as unit labor costs that are typically used in the NKPC
19We implement the same model specification test than previously and find no evidence that our results
are misspecified (p-values of the squared fitted values for the GDP deflator and CPI inflation are 0.29 and
0.87, respectively).
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literature. The ouput gap we use so far is constructed by means of the CF filter. Another
filter that is commonly used in the literature is the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (see e.g.
Nunes, 2010). Therefore we show how our results change if we use this latter approach
to construct the output gap. More importantly, many authors question the usefulness of
the output gap to represent marginal costs in estimations of Phillips curves (among them
Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2002; Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido, 2005). Other
variables commonly suggested are unit labor costs, labor share, unemployment rate (as
in the original Phillips curve), industrial production, capacity utilisation or inventories.
Estimation results for our models based on these marginal cost measures, as well as the
different output gap are presented in the Appendix in Table 11. Given potential measure-
ment error due to the use of surveys (for a discussion of this point see Adam and Padula,
2011) and potential endogeneity we also review our model results with the use of GMM.20
Finally, we analyse whether results differ for the mean versus the median of individual
responses for expected inflation; see Table 12 and 13 for GMM based results and those
based on the mean rather than the median, respectively. The main conclusions of Section
3.3 are robust to the different approaches presented in the Appendix.
4 The Effect of Forecasting Horizons
In this section, we depart from our baseline model in two ways. First, we increase the
horizon of inflation expectations used by private agents to determine current inflation
expectations. Second, we assess whether the formation process of inflation expectations
for future quarters differs from the formation process of inflation expectations for the
current quarter.
4.1 Near vs. Further-Ahead Forward-Looking Information
We aim at establishing the role of the horizon of forward-looking information in the expec-
tations formation process, and more precisely whether private forecasters put relatively
more weight on near or further-ahead forward-looking information. On the one hand one
may expect that private agents have a better understanding of the closer economic outlook
and thus put more weight on forward-looking information with a shorter horizon; on the
20We also test the LIML and CUE estimators and they yield similar results.
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other hand private agents might use forward-looking information as a representation of
the long-run of the economy and of the equilibrium value of inflation and therefore put
more emphasis on further-ahead forward-looking information.
The results for both GDP deflator and CPI models have a similar pattern given in Table
6. The weight of forward-looking information decreases with the forecasting horizon, from
0.82 at the one-quarter-ahead horizon to 0.68 at the four-quarter-ahead horizon for the
GDP deflator model and from 0.88 to 0.64 for the CPI model. Accordingly, the weight on
the backward-looking variable increases such that the sum of the forward- and backward-
looking variable remains insignificantly different from one. The R-square decreases as the
horizon increases, however not by much. It thus seems that private agents rely more on
their assessment of the near economic outlook rather than on further-ahead perspectives,
while the latter still has significant information for the nowcast.
Table 6 also features results on a model where the forward-looking component is the
average expected inflation rate over the following four quarters (Stp˜it+4). This model can
be justified, as agents might find it easier to make predictions for an average over some
quarters rather than for an individual quarter. They thus use this arguably more reliable
average in their information set when forming their nowcast. The results indicate that
this model works about as well as the benchmark for the GDP deflator, i.e. parameter
estimates, an F-test on the sum of the two coefficients of interest and the R2 are about the
same. For the CPI model the R2 is somewhat lower and the backward-looking variable
receives a higher weight as in the benchmark case.
In addition, it is worth noting that for the CPI model, we also have 10-year-ahead
expectations (on a smaller subsample starting in 1991Q4) and that the coefficient esti-
mated is 0.63, very close to the 1-year-ahead estimate. Beyond this latter horizon, private
forecasters give a similar weight to forward-looking information which suggests that these
expectations capture the private agents’ view on the long-run equilibrium value of inflation.
Our findings point out that private forecasters give more weight to their next quarter
forecasts than to the ones for a longer horizon, while the latter still play an important
role in determining expected current inflation. This might be the case as longer-horizon
inflation expectations are driven by beliefs about the central bank inflation target or are
projections of the trend inflation rate. Such an interpretation of our findings is in line with
the argument by Faust and Wright (2012) that inflation expectations for the following
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quarters represent forecasters’ expectations of how inflation moves from its current value
towards the perceived long-term inflation rate.
Table 6: Near vs. Further-Ahead Forward-Looking Information
GDP deflator CPI inflation
Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit Stpit
δ -0.02 -0.04* -0.05** -0.04* 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12)
βf (Stpit+2) 0.74*** 0.73***
(0.04) (0.09)
βf (Stpit+3) 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.04) (0.08)
βf (Stpit+4) 0.68*** 0.64***
(0.04) (0.08)
βf (Stp˜it+4) 0.79*** 0.75***
(0.04) (0.09)
βf (Stpit+10y) 0.63***
(0.17)
βb 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.26***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
const -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.13 0.07
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.48)
R2 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.65 0.35
βf + βb = 1 0.46 0.12 0.45 0.48 0.91 0.57 0.36 1.00 0.48
Obs 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 84
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of equation (3),
is conducted by OLS, where the horizon of the forward-looking component varies. Stp˜it+4 represents the
average expected inflation rate over the following four quarters. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard
errors are in parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3, except for 10-year-ahead CPI expectations
which start in 1991Q4. In the rows below the parameter estimates the R2 of the regression, the p-value of
an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 and the number of observations are presented.
4.2 Different Expectation Pairs
We now assess whether the formation process of inflation expectations for future quarters
differs from the formation process of inflation expectations for the current quarter. In this
model, we continue to consider that forecasts at the horizon h are determined by forecasts
at the horizon h+1 and we vary the value of h.
For the GDP deflator model, the weight put on backward- and forward-looking infor-
mation does not differ dramatically from the baseline model when h varies as can be seen
in Table 7. One exception is the βb coefficient for h = 2 which is insignificant while the
constant is significant. For the CPI model, the coefficient on forward-looking information
is slightly higher than in the baseline estimation when h varies, but most importantly
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the backward coefficient becomes null for h = 2 and 3. Finally, we estimate the effect
of 10-year-ahead expectations on four-quarter-ahead expectations for the CPI model, and
find an even larger and highly significant weight on forward-looking information.
Table 7: The Formation Process of Expectations at Longer Horizons
GDP deflator CPI inflation
Stpit+1 Stpit+2 Stpit+3 Stpit+1 Stpit+2 Stpit+3 Stpit+4
δ 0.02 -0.03* -0.002 0.01 0.001 -0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
βf (Stpit+2) 0.84*** 0.95***
(0.04) (0.02)
βf (Stpit+3) 0.87*** 0.98***
(0.04) (0.01)
βf (Stpit+4) 0.86*** 0.95***
(0.06) (0.01)
βf (Stpit+10y) 1.04***
(0.07)
βb 0.16*** 0.06 0.17** 0.04*** 0.01* 0.01 0.03***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
const -0.09 0.18** -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.32*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19)
R2 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.88
βf + βb = 1 0.92 0.01*** 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.03** 0.33
Obs 124 124 124 124 124 124 84
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of
equation (3), is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are
in parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3, except for 10-year-ahead CPI
expectations which start in 1991Q4. In the rows below the parameter estimates the R2
of the regression, the p-value of an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 and the
number of observations are presented.
These results suggest that the inflation expectations formation process and the relation-
ship between inflation expectations and both backward- and forward-looking information
are relatively stable across the horizons that private agents are typically considering.
5 Consumers vs. Professionals
Carroll (2003) compares professional and consumer forecasts and finds that household
expectations are not rational and that professional forecasts, which may be considered
rational, spread epidemiologically to the public. We aim here at shedding light on the
potential discrepancy between the expectations formation process of professionals and
consumers in order to assess whether consumers use the same relative weights on backward-
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and forward-looking information and whether the NKPC-based expectations model also
fits their expectations.
Table 8: Consumers vs. Professionals
SPF UMSCI UMSCI
Stpit+4 Stpit+4 Stpit+4
δ -0.03 -0.05 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
βf (SSPFt pit+10y) 1.04*** -0.09
(0.07) (0.10)
βf (SUMSCIt pit+5y) 0.30**
(0.14)
βb 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
const -0.32* 1.78*** 2.91***
(0.19) (0.44) (0.33)
R2 0.88 0.35 0.23
βf + βb = 1 0.33 0.00*** 0.00***
Obs 84 90 84
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of
equation 3 (including a constant), is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags
standard errors are in parentheses. The data set comprises 1990Q2-2012Q3 for the University
of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers: Inflation, and 1991Q4-2012Q3 for the SPF CPI series.
In the last two rows the R2 of the regression, as well as the p-value of an F test for the
hypothesis that βf +βb = 1 are presented. The final row reports the number of observations.
The output gap is derived by means of the CF filter.
We use the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers to measure consumers’
inflation expectations, available since 1991Q4 with a regular quarterly frequency. The
survey collects forecasts at the 4-quarter horizon and at the 5-year horizon and we estimate
the effect of the latter in setting the former. We compare this model to the closest available
pairs of professional expectations, i.e. the effect of 10-year-ahead forecasts on 4-quarter-
ahead forecasts for CPI inflation. Estimates are given in Table 8.
Estimates show a clear difference in the expectations formation process of professionals
and consumers. The coefficient on forward-looking information for consumers is 0.30, very
low compared to professionals: 1.04 while the coefficient on backward-looking information
is higher: 0.12 compared to 0.03. The coefficients do not add up to one in the case of
consumers, the constant is large, 1.78, and strongly significant and the R2 is remarkably
lower as in the SPF model. As far as this specific expectation pair is concerned (10-year-
ahead and 4-quarter-ahead expectations) we can thus reject the hypothesis that consumers
form their forecasts on the grounds of the NKPC. We also reject this hypothesis when
23
considering that consumers form their forecasts based on professional forecasts (column
3). Given a lack of consumer expectations in the Michigan survey for other horizons
we leave the important question of how consumer expectations are formed at different
horizons for future research.21
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at establishing whether longer-term inflation expectations play a role in
determining shorter-term ones. We evaluate the role of backward-, present and forward-
looking information in the private inflation expectations formation process using a NKPC-
based expectations formation model. We find that longer-term inflation expectations –
possibly representing the policy inflation target or the expected long-term trend – are
crucial in determining shorter-horizon inflation expectations. Professional forecasters put
relatively more weight on forward-looking information, while lagged inflation remains sig-
nificant and the contribution of the marginal cost measure is small and often insignificant.
These findings are robust to the use of real-time data, to various measures of marginal
costs, to the use of the mean of individual responses, to another estimation procedure
namely GMM, and to the inclusion of potentially relevant additional variables. The esti-
mated coefficients are similar to those found in the literature estimating the actual NKPC
suggesting that professional forecasters may indeed use this model to form their inflation
expectations. This result also holds for two different subsamples where during one in-
flation decreases rapidly while during the other it is relatively stable. We also find that
the estimated parameters of the NKPC-based expectations formation model are relatively
stable when the forecasting horizon varies or when we consider further-ahead horizons for
forward-looking information. Finally, consumers differ from professional forecasters in that
their expectations formation process is not well-captured by this NKPC-based equation.
21The fact that parameter estimates for consumers stand in contrast to our findings for professional
forecasters can be related to evidence by Carroll (2003) showing that households update their expectations
only with a certain probability as news from professionals spread to them. Similarly, Dra¨ger, Lamla, and
Pfajfar (2013) show that only 25% of consumers behave consistently with theory, i.e. a Phillips Curve.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data Appendix
Table 9: Data
Name Description Original frequency Time period
Real-time data first release
rgdp 1st Real GDP growth Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
pgdp 1st GDP deflator Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
cpi 1st Consumer price index Quarterly 1994Q3-2012Q3
Final data
rgdp Real GDP growth Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
pgdp GDP deflator Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
cpi Consumer price index Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
ulc Unit labour costs Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
ls Labour share Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
unemp Unemployment rate Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
indpro Industrial production index Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
cap uti Capacity utilisation Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
invent Inventories Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
Survey data (x-quarters-ahead horizon)
spf pgdp 0 SPF median pgdp expectations (0) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdp 1 SPF median pgdp expectations (1) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdp 2 SPF median pgdp expectations (2) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdp 3 SPF median pgdp expectations (3) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdp 4 SPF median pgdp expectations (4) Quarterly 1974Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdpm 0 SPF mean pgdp expectations (0) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdpm 1 SPF mean pgdp expectations (1) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdpm 2 SPF mean pgdp expectations (2) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdpm 3 SPF mean pgdp expectations (3) Quarterly 1968Q4-2012Q3
spf pgdpm 4 SPF mean pgdp expectations (4) Quarterly 1974Q4-2012Q3
spf cpi 0 SPF cpi expectations (0) Quarterly 1981Q3-2012Q3
spf cpi 1 SPF cpi expectations (1) Quarterly 1981Q3-2012Q3
spf cpi 2 SPF cpi expectations (2) Quarterly 1981Q3-2012Q3
spf cpi 3 SPF cpi expectations (3) Quarterly 1981Q3-2012Q3
spf cpi 4 SPF cpi expectations (4) Quarterly 1981Q3-2012Q3
spf cpi 10 SPF cpi expectations (10 years) Quarterly 1991Q4-2012Q3
msi 1 UMSC cpi expectations (1 year) Quarterly 1978Q1-2012Q3
msi 5 UMSC cpi expectations (5 years) Quarterly 1990Q2-2012Q3
This appendix lists the data that we use in the estimation of our models, as well as the
respective sources. We use quarterly frequency of the data series, where monthly series are
converted to quarterly frequency by taking the three-month average. The following releases
of the data are used: Final, first release and third release. The data series are available
for the time periods as indicated in Table 9 below and come from the following sources:
Real-time and SPF survey data from the website of the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia
and final data and the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers (UMSC) from the
Federal Reserve of St. Louis FRED database. For all price series annualised quarter on
quarter growth rates are calculated as: pit = ((
p(t)
p(t−1))
4 − 1) × 100.
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7.2 Preliminary Tests
Table 10: Unbiasedness of survey inflation expectations
Horizons (x quarters ahead)
GDP deflator (1st release) 0 1 2 3 4
α 0.02 0.35∗ 0.43∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
βu 0.92∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
βu = 1 0.17 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
GDP deflator (final) 0 1 2 3 4
α 0.50∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
βu 0.77∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
βu = 1 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
CPI inflation (1st release) 0 1 2 3 4
α 0.13 3.12∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗ 2.36∗
(0.88) (0.87) (0.76) (1.13) (1.35)
βu 1.00∗∗∗ −0.26 −0.00 0.04 0.06
(0.34) (0.40) (0.31) (0.40) (0.48)
βu = 1 0.99 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.05∗
CPI inflation (final) 0 1 2 3 4
α −0.29 1.07∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 1.55∗∗
(0.38) (0.42) (0.45) (0.55) (0.59)
βu 1.09∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17)
βu = 1 0.45 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Extended sample (1st release) 0 1 2 3 4
α −0.18 −0.09 −0.20 0.07 −0.15
(0.19) (0.26) (0.31) (0.39) (0.42)
βu 1.03∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15)
βu = 1 0.60 0.79 0.66 0.79 0.60
Extended sample (final data) 0 1 2 3 4
α −0.04 0.02 −0.03 0.27 0.00
(0.22) (0.27) (0.35) (0.41) (0.46)
βu 1.02∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15)
βu = 1 0.75 0.85 0.82 0.61 0.46
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of the equation
Stpit = α + βupit + ηt is conducted with OLS for each PGDP and CPI inflation and with both
real-time data (1st release) and final revised data. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors
are in parentheses. The data set goes from 1981Q3-2012Q3, for the first three inflation measures,
while it does not start before 1994Q3 for the first release of CPI inflation. The last two categories
present the results for final and first release of the GDP deflator on the long sample starting in
1968Q4, respectively. Below the parameter estimates the p-value corresponding to a t test of βu = 1
is presented.
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7.3 Robustness Tests
7.3.1 Other Marginal Cost Measures
Table 11: Other Marginal Cost Measures
Marginal cost measure
GDP deflator HP-GAP ULC LS UNEMP INDPRO CAPUTI INVENT
δ −0.04∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
βf 0.81
∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
βb 0.14
∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
const 0.09 0.11 −0.40 0.13 0.08 −0.70 0.07
(0.11) (0.14) (1.22) (0.19) (0.13) (0.67) (0.13)
R2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
βf + βb = 1 0.32 0.23 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.53
Obs 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
CPI inflation HP-GAP ULC LS UNEMP INDPRO CAPUTI INVENT
δ 0.04 −0.06 −0.07∗ −0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
βf 0.86
∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
βb 0.20
∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
const −0.23 −0.28 6.45∗ 0.11 −0.24 −1.35 −0.25
(0.29) (0.33) (3.77) (0.26) (0.28) (1.60) (0.28)
R2 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
βf + βb = 1 0.49 0.38 0.21 0.46 0.54 0.66 0.53
Obs 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of equation (3),
is conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are in parentheses. The data set
comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3. In the rows below the parameter estimates the R2 of the regression, the p-
value of an F test for the hypothesis that βf +βb = 1 and the number of observations are presented. The
following abbreviations for the marginal cost measures are used: HP-GAP=HP filter-based output gap,
ULC=Unit labour costs, LS=Labour share, UNEMP=Unemployment, INDPRO=Industrial production,
CAPUTI= Capacity utilisation, INVENT=Inventories.
Results with the HP-filtered output gap are very similar to the benchmark with the
exception that the output gap is now significant at the 5% level in the GDP deflator model,
though the coefficient is the same. The output gap measure remains insignificant for the
CPI model. Thus, the results for the output gap coefficient are not sensitive to the choice
of the filtering method.
Using unit labour costs as is common in many studies (e.g. Adam and Padula, 2011),
we find a positive coefficient for the GDP deflator model as would be predicted by theory.
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The coefficient is only marginally significant, i.e. at the 10% level. For all other marginal
cost measures the coefficient δ is very close to and statistically insignificantly different
from zero in the GDP deflator case. The estimates for βf and βb are very similar to those
presented in Table 1 and 3.
For the CPI inflation models all marginal cost measures result in an insignificant
coefficient except for the labor share. For the latter we find a negative and marginally
significant coefficient. In this model also the constant is marginally significant unlike in
the other models, where it is always insignificant. The results for the backward- and
the forward-looking coefficients are similar as before. The null hypothesis of the two
coefficients adding up to one cannot be rejected in any case.
7.3.2 GMM
As argued by Adam and Padula (2011), analyses based on survey data might be subject to
measurement errors, i.e. it is not clear that expectations are adequately measured nor that
survey expectations respresent actual expectations. Further, it is not clear ex ante whether
expectations of future inflation influence the nowcast or vice versa. Thus endogeneity issues
might be present. For these reasons we estimate the model by GMM instrumenting the
forward-looking variable; see GMM1 in Table 12. Given that the output gap is potentially
unobserved, we also estimate a version, where the output gap is instrumented as well;
see GMM2 in the same table. Finally, we also estimate a model, where we treat all
three variables, expected future inflation, the ouput gap and the lagged inflation rate as
endogenous; see the GMM3 results 22
22We use the same instrument set as Nunes (2010), namely four lags of inflation and two lags each of unit
labor costs, wage inflation, output gap and SPF expected inflation one-quarter ahead. This instrument
set is based on Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2005), while the survey data has been added given that
surveys are used as the endogenous variable rather than actual future inflation.
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Table 12: GMM estimation
GDP deflator CPI inflation
GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM1 GMM2 GMM3
δ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
βf 0.87
∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
βb 0.08
∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
const 0.11 0.11 0.08 −0.04 −0.03 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.68 0.68 0.68
βf + βb = 1 0.06
∗ 0.06∗ 0.24 0.88 0.86 0.67
Hansen J 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.87 0.80 0.78
Kleibergen− Paap 81.51 72.20 6.12 418.28 396.95 5.46
Endog 0.24 0.39 0.14 0.72 0.93 0.88
Obs 121 121 121 121 121 121
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Estimation of equation 3
(including a constant), is conducted by GMM, where the covariance matrix is corrected by the Newey-
West approach with automatic bandwith selection. Standard errors are in parentheses. The instrument
set consists of four lags of inflation, and two lags each of SPF expected inflation one-quarter ahead, unit
labor costs, the output gap and wage inflation. Under GMM1 the results for the model where only the
forward-looking variable is instrumented are given, for GMM2 also the output gap is treated as endgenous,
while for GMM3 the lagged inflation rate is further treated as endogenous. The output gap is derived by
means of the CF filter. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3. Below the parameter estimates the R2
of the regression, as well as the p-value of an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 are presented.
Further, the p-value corresponding to the Hansen J statistic, as well as the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are
given. Maximal IV relative bias critical values for the latter come from Stock and Yogo (2005) and are
20.90, 11.51 and 6.56 for GMM1, 19.12, 10.69 and 6.23 for GMM2 and 17.35, 9.85 and 5.87 for GMM3
at the 5, 10 and 20% level, respectively. The penultimate row presents p-values for an endogeneity test
based on the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics and the final row reports the number of
observations.
The results for the first two GMM approaches are almost identical, while in the third
case they differ slightly. For the GDP deflator the GMM1 and GMM2 approaches yield
a significant output gap coefficient with a similar value as before. However, compared
to the benchmark model, the weights on the forward- and backward-looking variables
change. While the former increases to around 0.87, the latter is smaller around 0.08. In
any case the two remain significant and the hypothesis of these adding to one can still
not be rejected at the conventional 5% level. The R2 is almost not affected. For the
GMM3 approach the results are very close to the baseline results with the difference of a
significant coefficient on the output gap.
For CPI inflation the GMM results follow a similar pattern. For GMM1 and GMM2
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the estimated γf is somewhat smaller than in the benchmark at around 0.79, while the
rest of the results remain almost unchanged. For GMM3 the parameter estimates come
once again closer to the benchmark results.
We perform some tests to examine the validity of the GMM approach. First, we present
the p-value corresponding to the Hansen J statistic. The p-value, above 0.60 in all cases,
shows that the null hypothesis of valid overidentifiying restrictions cannot be rejected.
Second, we report the Kleibergen-Paap rank statistic that corresponds to the first-stage
F statistic allowing for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. As shown in Table 12,
for GMM1 and GMM2 it exceeds the critical values by far and thus allows us to reject
the null hypothesis of weak instruments. In the GMM3 case, however, the evidence is not
sufficient to reject weak instruments which is related to the fact that we there have more
endogenous variables and less (included) instruments. Third, we test for endogeneity of
the variables instrumented in the GMM approaches. We present the p-value corresponding
to a test based on the difference between two Hansen-Sargan statistics (one for the GMM
approach and one for the OLS approach). In all three case and for both variables, i.e. the
GDP deflator and CPI inflation, this test provides evidence in favour of the validity of our
OLS benchmark approach.
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7.3.3 Mean vs. Median Expectations
Table 13: SPF Mean Expectations
GDP deflator CPI inflation
δ −0.01 0.07
(0.02) (0.05)
βf 0.90
∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.10)
βb 0.06
∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
const 0.03 −0.19
(0.06) (0.27)
R2 0.95 0.76
βf + βb = 1 0.07
∗ 0.56
Obs 124 124
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, re-
spectively. Estimation of equation 3 (including a constant), is
conducted by OLS. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard er-
rors are in parentheses. The data set comprises 1981Q3-2012Q3.
In the last two rows the R2 of the regression, as well as the p-value
of an F test for the hypothesis that βf + βb = 1 are presented.
The final row reports the number of observations. The output gap
is derived by means of the CF filter.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters also reports the mean of all respondents’ expecta-
tions. Although the mean might be influenced by potential outliers, it seems worthwile
to examine whether our conclusions so far hold for this expectation measure. Table 13
contains estimation results for SPF mean expectations.
The results for the GDP deflator are comparable to the benchmark, however, they
differ in a few points. First, the output gap measure is statistically insignificant. Second,
the forward-looking coefficient is somewhat larger around 0.90, while the backward-looking
coefficient is below 0.10, both being significant in all cases. However, the hypothesis of
these two adding up to one still cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Finally, the R2 is
slightly larger than before at around 0.95.
For CPI inflation the results are even closer to the benchmark. Apart from a slightly
smaller forward-looking coefficient and a slightly higher R2 no differences can be detected.
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